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CASE STUDY 
Using a simple poker game to introduce mixed strategies in 
game theory  
Salim Neil Khan, School of Computing, Electronics and Mathematics, Coventry University, 
Coventry, UK. Email: aa9803@coventry.ac.uk 
Abstract  
This article presents a classroom activity that introduces the idea of mixed strategies in game 
theory. In the activity, the students investigate a simple two-player poker game with the aim of 
determining the best strategies for both players. It comprises a mixture of hands-on playing, 
analysis using game theory, and simulation using computers.  
Keywords: Practical Activity, Game Theory, Poker, Simulation. 
1. Introduction  
At Coventry University, the mathematics undergraduate students, as part of a Problem Solving first 
year module, were taught some introductory game theory over two sessions. The first session 
involved the students engaging in a Prisoners’ Dilemma activity. This is a scenario first formulated 
by Tucker (1950), and it is briefly outlined in Section 2 of this article. In that activity, the students 
met concepts such as maximin, saddle point, and pure strategy; ideas in game theory originated by 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).   
This article concentrates mainly on the students’ second session. This built on their knowledge 
from the first session, by introducing a situation where there was no saddle point, and a mixed 
strategy was required. Section 3 describes a simple poker game that the students played, and 
measures empirically their resulting profits. Section 4 analyses the game theoretically and 
produces recommended playing strategies. In Section 5, the recommended strategies are 
implemented by the students and a comparison of profits is made. In Section 6, the theory is 
generalised so that recommended strategies can be obtained for different versions of the game. 
Then, in Section 7, a computer simulation is used to test the effectiveness of the theory. 
2. Prisoners’ Dilemma 
This is an often-used example as an introduction to game theory. There are many different 
versions, but they all roughly follow along similar lines as detailed below: 
• Arry and Butch are gangsters. The police have arrested them, but do not possess enough 
information for a conviction. Following the separation of the two men, the police offer both a 
similar deal; 
• If one testifies against his partner, and the other remains silent, the former receives a 1 
year sentence and the latter receives 10 years; 
• If both remain silent, both are sentenced to only 3 years in jail for a minor charge;  
• If each testifies against the other, each receives a 6 year sentence; 
• Each prisoner must choose either to betray or remain silent. Whilst choosing, they do not 
know the other’s decision. What should they do? 
The actions and outcomes can be displayed in a ‘payoff matrix’ (Table 1): 
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Table 1: Payoff matrix for Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Prison sentences (Arry, Butch) 
Butch 
Betray Silent 
Arry 
Betray (-6,-6) (-1,-10) 
Silent (-10,-1) (-3,-3) 
 
• Arry’s line of reasoning could be as follows. If Butch betrays, then Arry should also betray to 
maximise his own outcome. However, if Butch is silent, again Arry should betray to 
maximise his own outcome. Therefore Arry should betray whatever Butch does. This is 
called a maximin strategy as in essence he maximises his minimum gain; 
• Similarly, Butch could follow the same line of reasoning, and conclude that he himself 
should betray; 
• The result would then be that both would betray and consequently both end up with a 6 
year prison sentence. The cell (-6,-6) is called the saddle point as neither prisoner can 
improve their outcome by changing their mind if the other doesn’t change;  
• However, if they both agree to cooperate and both keep silent, they would both be better off 
with only a 3 year sentence. But, this does rely on trust as one of them could renege on the 
deal to personally benefit - hence the dilemma. 
3. Simple Poker Game 
The students were split into groups of three with each group given a standard pack of playing 
cards and 40 casino style chips. Two of the group played the game (Player 1 and Player 2), and 
the third dealt the cards and recorded the number of hands played.  
Player 1 (P1) and Player 2 (P2) were given 20 chips each and the rules were as follows: 
• P1 and P2 both put 1 chip into the pot. 
• P1 is given a card. He can either:  
o Fold – in which case P2 wins the pot; or 
o Bet 1 (i.e. put another 1 chip into the pot). 
• If P1 bets, P2 can then either: 
o Fold – in which case Player 1 wins the pot; or 
o Call (i.e. put another 1 chip into the pot). 
• If P2 calls, P1 shows his card: 
o If P1 has 9 or higher, P1 wins the pot; 
o If P1 has 8 or lower, P2 wins the pot. 
• Shuffle the cards and play again several times. 
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Figure 1: Cards and chips for simple poker game 
Before they started playing, the students were asked which player they thought was most likely to 
be in profit after several hands. The majority who responded suggested that it would be P2, as 
there were only 6 winning cards (9 to ace) for P1 but 7 winning cards (8 to 2) for P2. 
The game was played for three or four minutes, after which the profit/loss was recorded for P1 
along with the number of hands played. The process was repeated twice more with the students 
swapping roles within each group so that each had a turn at each role. 
There were 33 students in the class. Some of the results are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Students’ P1 Profits 
Student No. P1 Profit Number of Hands 
1 4 20 
2 -8 16 
3 -3 22 
etc. … … 
Total -8 455 
The total number of hands played was 455 and the P1 total profit was -8 chips. Thus the mean 
profit per hand was -8/455 = 0.018 i.e. P1 lost on average 0.02 chips per hand. 
The students were asked which strategies they employed, and it was evident that those P1’s who 
ended up in profit were mainly those who employed ‘bluffing’ i.e. Betting on a losing card (an 8 or 
lower) in the hope that P2 would Fold. 
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4. Game Theory Analysis 
Let Strategy 1 (S1) for P1 be ‘Fold if he has a losing card i.e. 8 or lower, Bet if he has a winning 
card i.e. 9 or Higher’ (F if L, B if W). 
Let Strategy 2 (S2) for P1 be ‘Bet if he has a losing card i.e. 8 or lower, Bet if he has a winning 
card i.e. 9 or Higher’ (B if L, B if W). 
Let S1 for P2 be Fold, and S2 for P2 be Call. 
Thus for each hand played there are 4 possible strategy pairs for the two players – (S1, S1), (S1, 
S2), (S1, S1), (S2, S1), and (S2, S2). (For each pair, the first number represents the strategy that 
P1 employs and the second number represents the strategy that P2 employs). 
Consider (S1, S1). This means that P1 will only Bet if he has a winning card and P2 will always 
Fold if P1 has Bet. Indeed this was a common pair of strategies amongst the students, particularly 
at the beginning. Cautious P1’s didn’t Bet if they had a losing card, and cautious P2’s assumed 
that if P1 had Bet then he must have a winning card. Here the expected profit for P1 can be 
calculated as follows:  
P1 Folds if he has 8 or lower, so  
𝑃(𝑃1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = 713 ,𝑃(𝑃1 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹) = 613. 
If P1 Folds, his profit is -1. If P1 Bets, his profit is 1 (because P2 will Fold). Hence 
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆1, 𝑆1)) = −1 × 713 + 1 × 613 = −0.077. 
Now consider (S2, S1). This means that P1 Bets when he has a winning card, and also Bets when 
he has a losing card. In the classroom session, as the playing progressed many P1’s who were 
employing S1 tended to realise that they were Folding a lot of hands, and thus started to bluff 
some hands – this was either through reasoning that they might have more chance of obtaining a 
profit, or through getting a bit bored with sticking with the same approach.  
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆2, 𝑆1)) = 1  
because here we are assuming that P1 is always Betting and P2 is always Folding. 
For (S2, S2), P1 Bets whatever his card, and P2 Calls. In the activity, as the playing progressed it 
was found that P2 Called more often, as he became more aware that P1 was bluffing. 
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆2,𝑆2)) = −2 × 713 + 2 × 613 = −0.154 
because P1 wins 6/13 of the time. 
Finally, consider (S1, S2), i.e. P1 only Bets if he has a winning card, and P2 Calls. Here,  
𝑃(𝑃1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = 713 ,𝑃(𝑃1 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹) = 613 . 
If P1 Folds, his profit is -1. If P1 Bets, his profit is 2 (because P2 has Called). Hence  
40  MSOR Connections 16(1) – journals.gre.ac.uk 
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆1,𝑆2)) = −1 × 713 + 2 × 613 = 0.385. 
These profits are displayed in a payoff matrix in Table 3: 
Table 3: Payoff matrix for Poker Game 
P1 Expected Profit 
P2 
S1 S2 
F C 
P1 
S1 F if L, B if W -0.077 0.385 
S2 B if L, B if W 1 -0.154 
There are some differences between this payoff matrix and the one from the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
(Table 1). Firstly, it can be seen that there is only one value in each cell here, as opposed to two in 
Table 1. This is because the poker game is a ‘zero-sum game’. That means that a gain for one 
player corresponds to a loss of equal magnitude for the other player. Hence for (S1, S1) the payoff 
for player 2 is 0.077, for (S1, S2) it is -0.385, and so on. As these values are assumed, it is not 
necessary to display them in the matrix. Also, as there is some uncertainty in the outcomes in 
terms of the probabilities of the card being dealt, the entries are expected values. These can 
appropriately be interpreted as the expected profit in the long run, because the game is repeated. 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma however would often be perceived as a game that would only be played 
once if in a realistic context. 
Being a zero-sum game, there is no possibility of cooperation helping both players, as a change in 
strategy could not increase the pay-out for both players. Moreover, there is no saddle point here 
i.e. there is no cell in the matrix with a value representing the optimal strategy pairing for the two 
players. Hence we would say that there is no ‘pure’ strategy solution.  
Nevertheless we can obtain a ‘mixed’ strategy (Maschler, Solan and Zamir 2013) solution i.e. to 
maximise his expected payoff, a player can use S1 some of the time and S2 some of the time. P1’s 
optimal mixed strategy solution is to use S2 a proportion, x, of the time so that his expected payoff 
is the same whatever P2 does, and P2’s optimal mixed strategy solution is to use S2 a proportion, 
y, of the time so that his expected payoff is the same whatever P1 does. This will result in a mixed 
strategy equilibrium. 
First, consider P1’s mixed strategy. Using the values from Table 3;  
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 𝑃2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) = −0.077(1 − 𝑥) + 1𝑥, 
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 𝑃2 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹) = 0.385(1 − 𝑥) − 0.154𝑥. 
Equating these to obtain the optimal mixed strategy for P1: 
−0.077(1 − 𝑥) + 𝑥 = 0.385(1 − 𝑥) − 0.154𝑥  
𝑥 = 0.29. 
This means that P1 should employ S2 29% of the time and S1 71% of the time. 
For P2’s optimal mixed strategy; again using the values from Table 3; 
Key:  
S1 – Strategy 1,  
S2 – Strategy 2,  
F – Fold, B - Bet, C – Call, 
L – has losing card,  
W – has winning card. 
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𝐸(𝑃2 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 𝑃1 𝑢𝐹𝐵𝐹 𝑆1) = −0.077(1 − 𝑦) + 0.385𝑦, 
𝐸(𝑃2 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 𝑃1 𝑢𝐹𝐵𝐹 𝑆2) = 1(1 − 𝑦) − 0.154𝑦 
Equating these gives: 
−0.077(1 − 𝑦) + 0.385𝑦 = 1 − 𝑦 − 0.154𝑦  
𝑦 = 0.67. 
Thus, P2 should use S2, 67% of the time, and S1, 33% of the time. 
In Table 4 these proportions are added to the payoff matrix. 
Table 4: Optimal Mixed Strategies and Payoffs in Poker Game 
P1 Expected Profit 
P2 
0.33 0.67 
S1 S2 
F C 
P1 
0.71 S1 F if L, B if W -0.077 0.385 
0.29 S2 B if L, B if W 1 -0.154 
If these mixed strategies are used, then  
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵) =  −0.077(0.71)0.33 + 0.385(0.71)0.67 + 1(0.29)0.33 − 0.154(0.29)0.67 = 0.23 
So, the optimal mixed strategies are that P1 should bluff 29% of the time, and P2 should Call 67% 
of the time. This would result in a 23% profit for P1. If one of the players deviates from this, his 
expected profit would decrease. 
5. Playing the Game again 
The students were then asked to play the game again several times, utilising the optimal strategies 
that they had just learnt. In order to randomly bluff approximately 29% of the time, P1 would glance 
at their watch or phone and bluff if the last digit of the seconds of the time was a 3, 6 or 9.  
Similarly P2 would Call if the first digit was 0-3. (Alternatively, appropriate sided dice could be used 
but these would not be as easy to conceal from the opponent and may inhibit the flow of the 
game.) 
The result for the class was a mean gain of 0.36 chips for P1, a lot better than the 0.02 average 
loss that P1 had the first time they played the game, highlighted in Section 3. The result was also 
considerably higher than the 0.23 predicted by the theory in Section 4. This is likely attributable to 
the fact that, when questioned afterwards, many of the P2’s admitted that they hadn’t stuck to the 
optimal 67% for Calling. They had taken it upon themselves to try and ‘spot’ when P1 was bluffing, 
resulting in a higher Call rate. 
6. Generalising the Theory 
The students were then asked to find optimal strategies in the general case where, in the poker 
game, the probability that P1 gets dealt a winning card is 𝑝. Using the same reasoning as in 
section 4, 
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𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆1, 𝑆1)) = −1(1 − 𝑝) + 1𝑝 = 2𝑝 − 1; 
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆2,𝑆1)) = 1; 
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆2,𝑆2)) = −2(1 − 𝑝) + 2𝑝 = 4𝑝 − 2; 
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆1,𝑆2)) = −1(1 − 𝑝) + 2𝑝 = 3𝑝 − 1. 
These expected profits are displayed in a payoff matrix in Table 5: 
Table 5: Payoff Matrix where P(Winning Card) = p  
P1 Expected Profit 
P2 
1-y y 
S1 S2 
F C 
P1 
1-x S1 F if L, B if W 2p-1 3p-1 
x S2 B if L, B if W 1 4p-2 
Finding the equilibrium point, P1 should bluff a proportion, 𝑥, of the time, where (2𝑝 − 1)(1 − 𝑥) + 𝑥 = (3𝑝 − 1)(1 − 𝑥) − (4𝑝 − 2)𝑥 
𝑥 = 13 � 𝑝1 − 𝑝�                                                                                 (1) 
P1 should Call a proportion, 𝑦, of the time, where (2𝑝 − 1)(1 − 𝑦) + (3𝑝 − 1)𝑦 = 1 − 𝑦 + (4𝑝 − 2)𝑦 
𝑦 = 23 . 
Interestingly, P2 should Call 2/3 of the time, whatever the probability of P1 receiving a winning 
card. This results in 
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵) = (2𝑝 − 1) 13 �1 − 13 � 𝑝1 − 𝑝�� + 𝑥 + (3𝑝 − 1) 23 �1 − 13 � 𝑝1 − 𝑝�� + (1) 13 �13 � 𝑝1 − 𝑝��+ (4𝑝 − 2) 23 �13 � 𝑝1 − 𝑝�� 
= 8𝑝 − 33                                                                                                                                             
Using the value of 𝑝 = 6/13 from the poker game, from Eq. (1) the proportion of time that P1 
should bluff, 
𝑥 = �13� � 613�1 − 613 = 27 = 0.29, 
and from Eq. (2),  
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𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵) = 8 � 613� − 33 = 0.23 
confirming the values found in Section 4. 
The students then found the optimal strategy for P1 if the rules of the game were changed slightly, 
so that P1’s winning cards were reduced to 10 or higher: 
Here 𝑝 = 5/13 , so 
𝑥 = 13� 5 13�1 − 5 13� � = 524 = 0.21 
and  
𝐸(𝑃1 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐵) = 8 × 613 − 33 = 0.03. 
Hence P1 should bluff 21% of the time and will end up on average with a profit of 3%.  
Many students were surprised or sceptical of this finding, in that P1 only has five winning cards to 
eight losing cards, but will still end up in profit through strategic game play. 
7. Computer Simulation 
To convince the sceptics, the students were asked to test the optimal strategy for the ’10 or higher’ 
rules. This time, rather than deal cards, to save time they played the game on a computer 
simulation created in Excel. An example of a screenshot is shown in Figure 2. 
The spreadsheet operated as follows: The student clicked on the Deal tab and a card was 
randomly dealt. In the example in Figure 2, this was an 8. The program then recommended to Bet 
or Fold according to the optimal strategy i.e. it randomly recommended 21% of the time to Bet on a 
card 9 or lower. The student then clicked on the Bet tab or Fold tab. If the student selected Bet, 
they then clicked on the P2 Decision tab. The program would then Call 67% of the time and Fold 
33% of the time. The number of chips won or lost for that hand were then displayed. The students 
then repeated the process, playing as many times as they wished, and the program displayed their 
mean profit and the percentage of the time that the student had bluffed. 
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Figure 2: Simulation of ’10 or Higher’ Poker game 
In Figure 2, the student’s bluff percentage was 20.2 which was close to the recommended 21%. 
This suggested that the student had likely followed the automatically generated recommendations 
by the program. Consequently the mean profit here of -0.02 was close to the expected profit of 
0.03 calculated in Section 6. Obtaining results from the other students in the class, those who had 
deviated from the recommended action generally ended up with a lower average profit. This helped 
to convince the sceptical students of the validity of the theory. 
8. Conclusions  
Through participating in a hands-on activity, the students investigated and applied mixed strategies 
in game theory to see them work in practice. There is much research that activity led learning is a 
successful learning mechanism, for example see Freeman et al. (2014). Hence the activity outlined 
in this article could be considered a useful tool when teaching an introduction to mixed strategies in 
game theory. 
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